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4. In March 1951, [redacted] queried Greengrocer 1 on the credibility of SLAVIK'S statements. Greengrocer 1 responded, "I don't think that the Soviets would trust SANITZER to work in East Germany. They probably abducted him to deny his use to Western intelligence services. SANITZER'S wife was ousted from her flat, located in the Soviet Sector, at the end of the war. She has repeatedly petitioned the Soviets for permission to remove some cheap odds and ends of furniture from the apartment and has never been permitted to do so. It doesn't seem likely to me that the Soviets would be so inconsiderate if SANITZER were actually assisting them in Germany. A State Policeman chatted with Mrs. SANITZER recently and learned that she had not received any information from her husband since his abduction."

5. [redacted] has mentioned subject's name intermittently in conversations with Greengrocer 1, fishing for his reaction, but has caught nothing which indicates that Greengrocer 1 has recently changed his opinion regarding SANITZER'S status. On 18 October, Greengrocer 1 passed us the following unsolicited report which was dated 4 September 1951:

"Anna SANITZER, wife of the former Gestapo official, Johann SANITZER, is currently employed as a telephone operator at the Bns Malleczek Machine and Tool Factory, III Bezirk, Rechte Bahngasse 30/32. It is understood that she has become resigned to her husband's disappearance but gets upset by recurrent newspaper articles which have been appearing about her husband. It has been independently established that Mrs. SANITZER does not receive mail posted abroad at either her residence, Vienna XIV, Perchtoldsdorf Hochstrasse 34, or at her place of employment."

6. Two enigmatic references must be included in this roundup.

a. In April in an evening session in Greengrocer 1's residence, the latter remarked that he had only academic interest in SANITZER'S fate since he felt sure that the ex-Gestapo official did not represent a present or potential security threat in Austria. In the [redacted] Greengrocer 1 promised to permit [redacted] to read the reports in his SANITZER file, but to date has not done so. Initial reminders brought forth the response that the file had been misplaced. Later queries were politely answered by statements that the file was still missing. This reaction is considered noteworthy because it is the only time to our knowledge that a file has disappeared in the labyrinth of Greengrocer 1's paper apparatus. Equally disturbing, it is the only time that Greengrocer 1 has reneged on a promise. Immediate and obvious conclusions can be drawn:

(1) The file is actually misplaced or lost.

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(2) The British have the file.

(3) Someone, unknown to Greengrocer 1, lifted the file.

We will continue to probe here in an effort to clarify the status of the missing folder.

b. On a subsequent evening, Greengrocer 1 confided that he is personally in touch with an ex-SANITZER staff member whom "I can see whenever I want to. (Greengrocer 1 implied that he didn't see the person very often.) This man is not now engaged in any intelligence activity. He is living here very quietly. Before the Gestapo Headquarters was destroyed, he managed to hide at his residence carbon copies of some reports from the SANITZER office and he also has retained a large number of personal notes on the work he had been doing." This skeleton of a lead will be played back to Greengrocer 1 from time to time with the intention of seeking out a little more data on the shadowy ex-official.

7. As an attachment, we are forwarding traces on subject copied from local CIC files.

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14 July 1948

SUBJECT: SANITZER, Johann, Gestapo, Vienna Section IV 2.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Reference is made to Top Secret report LSX33 of Headquarters Company "A" 2677 Regiment, Office of Strategic Services, on subject, dated July 1945, describing subject's counter intelligence activities directed against Soviet intelligence operations.

In June 1948 subject expressed the desire for an interview with a representative of a U.S. intelligence, whereupon he was contacted at the LANDESGERICHT jail.

Subject states that the Soviets want to have him transferred into their custody in order to obtain certain information listed below, which could be used to the disadvantage of the U.S. and of Austria. It is noted that an informant of subject, a certain WEIDINGER, who penetrated the Communists for subject, was reported removed from the LANDESGERICHT jail by the Soviets, and that the Soviets have obtained a copy of subject's hearing wherein he explained the military nature of his activities to the Austrian authorities. Subject does not desire to evade Austrian trial, but requests intervention by the U.S. authorities to prevent his transfer to Soviet custody. Subject states he expects to be released in the near future, for he is of the impression his innocence has been established in the hearings of the Austrian authorities. Subject claims no Allied agents apprehended or investigated by his section were executed, as required by German law at that time, and that he was extremely lenient towards persons aiding or abetting foreign agents.

Subject believes his knowledge of the following topics and networks have made the Soviets determined to gain him in their custody, and would make U.S. intervention imperative:

1. Reference is made to the report of OSS, LSX33, listing subject as an expert on Soviet ciphers, codes, Soviet and COMINTERN intelligence operations. The Soviets probably suspect that his experience may be utilized in future counter intelligence operations directed against Soviet intelligence activities.
2. The Soviets presumably are interested in gaining evidence of double roles played by some of their agents known to subject.
3. Subject was in control of a network covering the areas Slovenia, Yugoslavia, Austria and Slovakia. This network is comprised of about 100 informants in all strata of society - Communists, aristocrats, priests, and former members of opposition parties. Although subject refuses to disclose their identity at present, such a network is likely to have existed, and it can be expected that subject will surrender the persons involved to the Soviet

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intelligence under duress. These former Gestapo informants, many in key positions, would certainly be susceptible to Soviet pressure, and could easily be compelled to operate on behalf of Soviet intelligence.

4. Subject trained a group (about 30) of UPA (Ukrainian Liberation Army) agents in Bratislava and Vienna for missions behind the Red Army lines. A certain Lipitzky (phonetic), an Ukrainian sent from Berlin by the RSHA, was in charge of these UPA agents. This group arrived safely in Passau upon the termination of the war. The Soviets may fear that this group today is engaged in anti-Soviet underground operations and desire to learn more about this and similar groups.

5. Subject claims the Soviets have discovered that he has knowledge of a group of dissident Red Army officers which maintained contact with the Abwehr during the war. If the following information is proved to be correct, this probably constitutes the strongest argument for U.S. intervention to prevent subject's being taken into Soviet custody.

During the investigations of the 20 July uprising, subject was ordered by RSHA to find the alleged radio contact of the Abwehr with the Soviet Union. Subject states he was able to locate this contact, which was maintained by AST XVII. It was determined that this project was not utilized by the dissident Abwehr to facilitate their revolt but as a source of positive intelligence. The project continued after 20 July under the auspices of the RSHA.

The Abwehr was in contact with a dissident group of high Red Army officers directed by a certain SAMOJEV, chief of the Red Army signal training. Radio contact was maintained under the guise of practice transmissions from four different points in the Soviet Union. Subject recalls one radio operator was located in the Crimea who used the cover name "ANATOLE". Those Soviet transmissions were received by a certain LONGIN, a white Russian immigrant working for AST XVII, first in Budapest and later in Vienna. LONGIN had been a member of the anti-Bolshevik Russian exile movement of a former Czarist General TURKUL. The AST contact to LONGIN was established by a certain KAUDER, alias KIATT, a Jewish operative of the AST. KAUDER had met LONGIN in a Budapest jail, both held for some minor offense. The AST used KAUDER as intermediary to LONGIN in this project until 1944, when KAUDER was removed on charges of graft. After this, LONGIN maintained direct contact with Colonel WIESNER of the AST, a German national now believed to be in Germany.

After the war LONGIN and KAUDER were held by the OSS in Salzburg. Subject believes a successor agency of the OSS is utilizing LONGIN to maintain contact with the dissident Red Army cell around Samojev.

Subject also remembers a newspaper report on the death of KAUDER-KIATT following a car accident, which he considers a ruse to protect KAUDER-KIATT, whom he also believes to be working for the U.S. Intelligence and whom the Soviets

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previously had attempted to kidnap. A certain KNITTEL, the secretary of KAUDER-KIATT, reportedly is working for CIC Gaunden.

Note: It is suggested that ESD 22 receive information copy of this report.

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COPY